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Abstract: We explore how peace or war can occur in the presence of com-
mitment problems. These problems can be reduced by institutions of good
governance or, alternatively, state capacity which (i) can be considered a col-
lective good and (ii) can be improved through investments. We show how the
likelihood of a peace agreement depends on the level of state capacity and on
investments in state capacity made by adversaries. In accordance with existing
evidence but contrary to various theories of con￿ ict, we ￿nd that income levels
unambiguously increase the chance of peace. Among other issues, we discuss
the critical role of external actors in encouraging or discouraging commitment
and in developing good governance institutions.
11 Introduction
Civil wars and other internal con￿ icts typically take long to resolve. For in-
stance, the median length of a civil war in the post-World War II period has
been more than seven years and persistence has been high as well (Collier et.
al., 2003, p.80). Why wars last for as long as they do is akin to asking why
con￿ ict occurs in the ￿rst place. Answers that have been proposed in the litera-
ture include incomplete or asymmetric information; indivisibilities or increasing
returns on matters of contention; risk-seeking behavior; hate, revenge, and other
preferential externalities; excessive optimism and wrong mental models of the
world; and incomplete contracting or commitment di¢ culties.1
Not all reasons for con￿ ict are as important at the end of con￿ ict as at the
start. As con￿ icts drag out over months and years, adversaries￿incomplete in-
formation can be expected to subside, as should excessive optimism or incorrect
mental models of the con￿ ict. In some cases, indivisibilities can persist reduc-
ing the contracting space for peace agreements to nothing. Additionally, it is
possible that hate and the urge for revenge could increase with time, fatalities,
and atrocities and thus complicate a con￿ ict￿ s ending. One persistent reason,
however, that can cause con￿ ict and perpetuate it is di¢ culties with trust or
the absence of su¢ cient external enforcement in making adversaries abide by
a peace agreement. That is, to phrase it di⁄erently, contracts on arming are
di¢ cult and costly to enforce and commitments to speci￿c levels of arming can
be di¢ cult to implement.2
However, the modeling choice is not just between perfect commitment and
its complete absence. Between the two extremes of the philosopher￿ s state of
nature (where there is no possibility of commitment) on the one hand, and
1For overviews of explanations of con￿ict see Fearon (1995), Hirshleifer (1995), and Skaper-
das (2006). For overviews of the economics of con￿ict and the literature on civil wars, respec-
tively, see Gar￿nkel and Skaperdas (2007) and Blattman and Miguel (2009). A thoughtful
discussion on how these models pertain to the sustainability of post-con￿ict peace can be
found in Cunningham (2006).
2Fearon (1995) ￿rst discussed the ideas associated with the problems of incomplete con-
tracting, and dynamic models of the problem include Gar￿nkel and Skaperdas (2000) and
Powell (2006). These enforcement issues as discussed speci￿cally in the context of peace
agreements are further developed in Werner and Yen (2005).
The ￿rst part of our model (on the choice between con￿ict and peace) is based on McBride
and Skaperdas (2007, 2009), whereas the second part of the model (on investments in con￿ict
management) is party inspired by Genicot and Skaperdas (2002). Kumar (2008) also examines
a dynamic model of growth that incorporates investment in property rights.
2economic models in which property rights are perfectly and costlessly enforced
(so that commitment is perfect and costless) on the other hand, there is a
broad spectrum of commitment space which de￿nes the agreements that can
be reached and which agreements are not credible. Adversaries are typically
able to make some limited commitments using third parties, social and political
institutions that they have inherited from the past, or elements of the state
that might have the independence and strength to partially guarantee peace
agreements. That is, commitment problems can be thought to depend on a type
of collective good that can be variously attributed to governance, institutions,
trust, social capital or bridging capital, property rights, or state capacity, the
last term being the one we will be mostly using in this paper. With time,
the adversaries themselves could engage in actions that enhance their collective
ability to commit. Instances of such actions range from the hiring of a (limited)
external enforcer, the podesta, by rival clans in late Medieval Genoa (Greif,
1998) to the often drawn-out negotiations, con￿dence-building measures, and
state-building that adversaries have engaged in more recent times.3
We ￿rst explore the factors that determine whether peace or con￿ ict will
prevail for a given, exogenous level of state capacity. Given a certain level of
arming, each adversary compares expected payo⁄s from con￿ ict against those
of a peace agreement. Con￿ ict has costs that may involve destruction and
additional use of resources, but provides the chance of being in a better strategic
position in the future and having to spend less on arming in order to maintain
such a position. Peace avoids the current costs of con￿ ict but requires, because
of commitment problems, the continued maintenance of some level of arming in
order to have the bargaining position that will allow the peace agreement to be
self-enforcing. The higher the level of commitment, induced by greater state
capacity, the lower is the level of arming that each side would have to maintain
in order to self-enforce peace.
3Credible, neutral and respected peacekeepers, mediators and observers from international
and regional institutions can also ￿ll the gap, creating commitment space for otherwise un-
tenable agreements. We caution, though, that just as NGOs providing humanitarian aid can
supplant local capacity to deliver social services, so too can international peacekeeping con-
tribute to peace through building commitment space that does not re￿ect actual state capacity
for commitments. Policymakers must ask, when peacekeepers leave, what state capacity has
been built in country to deliver this commitment space? For more on the importance of
aligning political missions and state capacity building to peacekeeping missions for success in
peacebuilding, see Doyle and Sambanis (2000).
3Peace becomes possible only when all parties to the agreement prefer it to
continued con￿ ict, and that is possible when state capacity is above a critical
threshold. The threshold level itself depends on the destruction and other pos-
sible extra costs of con￿ ict but also on the discount factor, the shadow of the
future. In particular, the e⁄ect of a longer shadow of the future tends to be a
detriment to peace in the sense that state capacity￿ s critical threshold becomes
higher the higher is the discount factor.
We next explore the determinants of state capacity. In section 3 we consider
three factors that could a⁄ect the degree of commitment through state capacity.
First, outside forces can intervene for good (third parties genuinely interested
in peace) or bad (third parties that have an interest in the continuation in con-
￿ ict or are biased toward changing the terms of an eventual peace in favor of
one of the adversaries). Second, the degree of commitment depends on the his-
tory of interaction among the parties, with a longer history of con￿ ict, mutual
isolation, and distrust reducing the capacity for commitment. Finally, the ad-
versaries themselves can engage in investments that improve state capacity for
commitments.
In section 4 we extend our model to consider the ￿rst and last factors.
In this environment, adversaries will undertake positive levels of investment
in state capacity only when they expect to induce peace, although they will
also engage in some arming given that commitment is not typically perfect in
equilibrium. In this respect, our model captures the truly ambivalent nature
of peace negotiations, where the actors grip the olive branch in one hand and
the sword in the other. When the adversaries expect war, there is no reason
to invest in state capacity, and they instead concentrate all of their resources
on arming to enhance their probability of winning, con￿rming that investments
in state capacity for commitments can serve as credible signals of actors￿belief
in peace. Whereas the levels of investment in state capacity in equilibrium
are unique, those are not necessarily the only levels of investment that might
be expected to occur. It would be generally in the collective interest of both
parties to engage in investments that are higher than those that would occur
in equilibrium and if the parties could coordinate on higher levels they might
be able to do so. The ability to coordinate on and implement such investments
may well be a key factor for some countries in maintaining peace.
4Another notable e⁄ect we ￿nd is that an increase in the value of the "prize"
that is the object of contention between adversaries unambiguously increases
investments in state capacity (except when these investments are already zero)
and thus unambiguously enhances the payo⁄s under peace. If the value of the
prize and income are correlated, then this result implies that we would expect
higher income countries to have both higher state capacity and better prospects
of peace, whereas lower income countries would tend to have lower levels of state
capacity and more ￿ghting. This is in line with the correlations observed (Collier
et. al., 2003) but also with the attempts to disentangle causality, with Miguel
et. al. (2004) showing how lower incomes appear to cause con￿ ict with data
for African countries. While intuitively plausible, the correlation between low
income and con￿ ict has been di¢ cult to explain theoretically since the typical
contest model of con￿ ict (that we also employ in section 2 below) shows a posi-
tive relation between income and arming, with the latter considered a measure
of con￿ ict. Our dynamic model distinguishes between actual con￿ ict and peace
under the threat of con￿ ict (in which there is still arming). By doing that, we
no longer have to consider arming as a proxy for con￿ ict. More importantly,
not only do we ￿nd a relationship between income and con￿ ict that is consistent
with the empirical evidence but also we ￿nd a very plausible mediating mech-
anism: the incentive to invest more in state capacity for commitments when
there is more income at stake. This is consistent with recent ￿ndings that weak
political systems (proxied by anocracies, but possibly more re￿ ective of young
democracies) are more prone to con￿ ict than established political systems and
stronger bureaucracies (Fearon and Laitin, 2003, Keefer, 2009).
2 The basic setting with exogenous state capac-
ity
We begin with a model in which state capacity is ￿xed. We consider the case
of two groups, A and B , each contesting a rent (or, income) Y in each period
over an inde￿nite time horizon, with the future discounted under a constant
discount factor ￿ (which is strictly between 0 and 1). Because we are interested
in asking questions about the types and sustainability of peace, we assume that
these two groups are identical. This is a reasonable assumption when discussing
5post-con￿ ict peace agreements because it re￿ ects the fact that both agents may
have the ability to perpetuate a con￿ ict and that the winner cannot be predicted
with any kind of certainty.4
Each group i = A;B can produce arms in period t, denoted git; with constant
marginal cost. Furthermore, we assume that the payo⁄s under War and Peace
are di⁄erent, re￿ ected by the superscripts w and p. The main di⁄erences are
that under War, there is destruction, (1 ￿ ￿), of a fraction of the rents and the
winner gains an advantage in future interactions. For simplicity, we suppose
that the winner of con￿ ict receives the rent in all future periods, whereas the
loser does not receive anything (for a relaxation of this assumption, see McBride
and Skaperdas, 2007). Under Peace a fraction of the rents are protected for both
agents by the quality of the institutions they create to regulate and enforce their
peace agreement, re￿ ected by a security parameter ￿. We assume ￿ is ￿xed for
now but assume in Section 4 that it can be increased with costly investments.






￿Y ￿ git; (1)
where ￿ < 1 and
git
gAt+gBt represents the probability group i wins the con￿ ict.
(For an overview of such functions, see section 2 of Gar￿nkel and Skaperdas,
2007.)












Y ￿ git; (2)
where 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. Note that the term in braces represents group i￿ s share of the
rent. Under Peace, the share each side receives depends partly on state capacity
and partly on arming. The better the state capacity, the larger the share of
rents that are not contestable via threats with arms. When ￿ is close to 0,
arming plays the biggest role in determining the share of each group. When
￿ is close to 1, arming plays very little role in the share of each side. That
4Recent works by Chacon, Robinson and Torvik (2006) and Gates and Strom (2007) argue
that both con￿icts and power-sharing peace agreements are more likely when adversaries are
equally matched, because are, in a sense, con￿ictual relationships whether through violence
or other means. Gates and Strom contend that power-sharing agreements between unevenly
matched opponents are unsuccessful, resulting in disproportional political power, positive
incentives for spoilers and untenable long-term peace solutions.
6the contestable portion of group i￿ s rents depends on how well it would do in a
con￿ ict captures how the bargaining outcome under the threat of con￿ ict will
depend on the relative strength of each group as measured by arms.5
We note that it is typical for peace agreements to have the parties to the
agreement maintain their military capacity, either informally ￿through militias
and other forms of military readiness ￿or formally as part of the agreement.
Lebanon, for example, has had quotas for its di⁄erent confessional groups in
the military as well as for its political and administrative o¢ ces. In addition
to any formal agreements that involve explicit quotas in national armies, di⁄er-
ent political parties, and administrative or electoral o¢ ces, ethnic or religious
groups need to maintain militias and keep other resources (arms caches, training
grounds, readiness for mobilization and special funds dedicated to them) both
as a deterrent and as a bargaining tool.6
In a particular period t, the two sides make the following decisions:
1. Each side chooses its arming level git.
2. Given these levels of arming, each side makes a decision whether to accept
a Peace agreement or not. If both agree to Peace, then Peace occurs. If
one or both choose con￿ ict, then War occurs.
We are interested in knowing when an equilibrium with Peace exists. Specif-
ically, we will show when the highest payo⁄ symmetric Markov Perfect Equi-
librium (MPE) with peace exists.7 This setting is a dynamic game with three
states: A has full power and obtains all the rents without need to arm or bargain
with B; B has full power; and both can contest for a share or all of the rents.
The ￿rst two states can only be reached after a con￿ ict occurs. The setting
begins in the third state. A Markov strategy is a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
in which each group chooses a strategy that depends not on the history of play
but on the state. With choices only relevant to the third, contestable, state, a
Markov strategy tells a player to play a ￿xed strategy in that state.
5Anbarci et. al. (2002) show how di⁄erent bargaining solutions can induce di⁄erent levels
of arming in equilibrium when the utility possibilities frontier is strictly convex.
6See, for example, the case studies of power-sharing agreements in Colombia (Gutierrez
and Guataqui, 2009) and Lebanon (Salti and Frangie, 2009).
7See Fudenberg and Tirole (1996) for a discussion of MPE. MPE are easier to solve than
history dependent strategies. Additionally, our setting immediately goes to an abosrbing
state after con￿ict thus precluding history dependent punishment.
7Yet before turning to a Peace equilibrium, we ￿rst note that there always
exists a symmetric MPE with War. Conditional on the other choosing War in
step 2, a group￿ s choice between War and Peace is irrelevant because only one
side is needed to start con￿ ict, so both choosing War can always be sustained
in an MPE. There will thus be a MPE in which each chooses an arming level
g￿
W and War. Given that its opponent chooses this strategy, the value function










Y ￿ git: (3)
To ￿nd the equilibrium g￿
W, we obtain the ￿rst order condition of (3) and use
symmetry g￿







































The MPE has each group choose this g￿
W and War. Group i￿ s present discounted
























We are interested in when an equilibrium with Peace exists. Consider a
Markov strategy of this form: "In period t of a contestable state: set git = g￿
P
































Each choosing this strategy will be a MPE (hereafter, equilibrium) when
neither group can make a one-shot deviation to achieve a higher payo⁄. There
are three types of one-shot deviation to consider. The ￿rst type is to set git 6= g￿
P
in step 1 and choose Peace in step 2. The second type is to set git = g￿
P but
8choose War in step 2. The third is to set git 6= g￿
P in step 1 and choose War in
step 2.
A ￿rst type deviation will not be made if, conditional on peace, g￿
P is a Nash
equilibrium of the single-period arming game. To ￿nd this g￿
P, we obtain the

























P arming level, no ￿rst type deviations will be made. From now on,
we assume this g￿








A second type deviation will not be made in step 2 if the payo⁄ of choosing















￿ ￿ 1 ￿
2(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿ ￿￿ (7)
This value ￿￿ is the minimum level of state capacity required to prevent a
second type deviation. Observe that this is more likely to be met when con￿ ict
is destructive (￿ low) and the future is heavily discounted (￿ low).
Figure 1 illustrates how this critical state capacity level is found. The solid
horizontal line denotes the payo⁄ to initiating War given ￿ and ￿, and the solid
upward sloping line is the value to Peace given ￿ and ￿. These are, respectively,
the right and left hand sides of condition (6). The critical level ￿￿ is found
where the two lines cross. The War equilibrium exists for all parameter values,
but the Peace equilibrium only exists when ￿ ￿ ￿￿. The dotted horizontal
line represents the value to War with destruction parameter ￿
0 > ￿. With less
9destruction (higher ￿), the value to War is increased, and a higher level of state
capacity is necessary for Peace to be possible.
A third type deviation will not be made in steps 1 and 2 when V P
i is greater















Y ￿ g0: (8)
The right hand side (RHS) of this inequality is the highest payo⁄ achievable
when choosing g0 given g￿
P and War. The left hand side is an increasing linear
function of ￿ but does not vary with ￿. The right hand side is an increasing
function of ￿ but does not vary with ￿. Both sides increase in ￿. With some
work (see Appendix A), it can be shown that (8) is violated under conditions
qualitatively similar to those for the ￿rst type deviation.
To summarize, we observe that the Peace equilibrium exists, and Peace is
more likely to arise, when
(i) state capacity is high (￿ high),
(ii) con￿ ict is destructive (￿ low).
(iii) the future is heavily discounted (￿ low).
When these three conditions hold, Peace is a self-enforcing arrangement
between potential adversaries. Peace is costly to maintain as each side must
continue to arm to maintain a bargaining position. However, with the peace
arming level g￿
P = 1
4 (1 ￿ ￿)Y , we observe that the higher the state capacity the
fewer the resources devoted to arming. With perfect governance institutions
(￿ = 1), the Peace equilibrium achieves an e¢ cient outcome with no resources
spent on arming and no resources destroyed by con￿ ict.
That Peace requires low discount factors runs counter to the standard Folk
Theorem intuition. However, as McBride and Skaperdas (2007, 2009) explain,
this counterintuitive result follows from the dynamic nature of the interaction.
Because one group can eliminate its opponent through con￿ ict, engaging in a
con￿ ict may be costly today but yield high rewards tomorrow as future resources
need not be devoted to arming.8
8McBride and Skaperdas (2009) and Tingley (2009) provide experimental evidence on the
negative e⁄ect of a longer shadow of the future when there is con￿ict (but not any investments
in con￿ict management).
103 On the determinants of commitment and state
capacity
We have seen the critical importance the level of the parameter ￿ has in whether
War or Peace prevails. Low levels of the parameter imply that the mechanisms
that induce Peace are rather undeveloped and the adversaries need to keep high
levels of arming in order to maintain their bargaining power. In turn, this high
cost of Peace would lead to War. When the mechanisms for supporting Peace
are more developed and the parties can keep lower levels of arming in order
to maintain their respective bargaining positions, War is not attractive. What
determines, then, the level of governance, security, property rights, or, in short,
state capacity, which encourages these commitments to peace? We ￿rst brie￿ y
discuss some of the possible determinants in general, and then examine the
actions that the adversaries might be able to take to improve their ability to
commit.
We can conceive of ￿ as a function of accumulated investments, i.e., "capi-
tal." The least that is required is the presence of channels of communication and
diplomacy between the participants. For higher levels of commitment, rudimen-
tary forms of governance become necessary: mechanisms for making collective
decisions and agreements; elementary courts for the adjudication of disputes;
security o¢ cers for the enforcement of decisions, court rulings, and agreements.
An example of such a rudimentary institution of governance that was agreed
upon and paid for by adversaries who were seeking to minimize outright con￿ ict
among them is that of the podesta in fourteenth century Genoa (Greif, 1998).
The main competing clans ￿previously engaged in intermittent civil war for
decades ￿agreed to hire every year an outsider, the podesta, along with a limited
sta⁄and armed men, who served as administrator and law enforcer but without
having enough military capacity to ally himself with one of the clans and expect
to defeat the others. Thus, the clans paid for the services of the podesta to
maintain a delicate balance of power. They still had to maintain some military
readiness but evidently not as much as in the absence of the podesta and with
lower risk of warfare.
Whereas many developing countries might still bene￿t from institutions like
that of the podesta, any institutions that allow for greater commitment and less
arming on the part of the adversaries would be useful. Predictable and institu-
11tionalized ways of law making increases the commitment power of government
that the laws will continue to hold (Keefer, 2009). Building professional police
forces, armies, a modern bureaucracy as well as courts are all means for enforc-
ing such laws.9 Modern, western versions of these institutions take tremendous
resources and time to build and should only be built for their function and not
just to mimic form embodied by the modern state. Like the podesta, local in-
stitutions, expanded to sustain peace and build credible commitments can lead
to future investments and expansion of state capacity. Examples of such in-
stitutions include the Con￿ ict Early Warning and Early Response Mechanism
(CEWARN) active in pastoral areas of Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Sudan,
which serves as a local observer and early warning system to avoid con￿ ict,
where publicity acts as a type of enforcement. Likewise, the Gacaca courts
of Rwanda can be interpreted as a local investment in state capacity to make
credible commitments in post-con￿ct as they provided a local means of settling
grievance that was more credible than state institutions. Post-con￿ ict countries
and countries at high risk of con￿ ict that do not invest in such institutions must
continue arming in order to maintain their respective bargaining positions
We next review the actors and forces that can determine investments in
governance.
3.1 Outsiders
No country is an island when it comes to in￿ uences on civil wars and other
domestic con￿ icts. Outsiders ￿states, international organizations, NGOs, ￿rms,
and powerful individuals ￿typically have direct economic or other interests in
the country whereas larger states might have longer-term, geopolitical interests
on the political and economic direction a country takes.
The post-World War II collective security arrangements tend to guarantee
existing borders. While these arrangements might have reduced the number of
interstate wars, the large number of civil wars indicates that collective security
norms do not spill over into the domestic arena10. With regard to improving
9The contribution of a modern bureaucracy towards peace and prosperity is not to be
overlooked. Research by Przeworski et al (2000) and Keefer (2009) demonstrate that the
level of voice and accountability embodied by democratic institutions does not contribute to
peace and prosperity so much as the establishment of permanent institutions and bureaucracies
that reliably de￿ne the "rules of the game".
10Indeed, the legacy of international borders de￿ned by the international state system may
12domestic security and con￿ ict management, outsiders can be a source of both
good and bad in￿ uence.11 They can be a source of good by providing mediation
services and even by nudging the adversaries with sticks and carrots toward
solutions that the sides could not come up by themselves. They can provide
short-term and long-term assistance with state building, from direct budgetary
help to advice on the building of bureaucracy and courts, as well as of the more
conventional technical assistance in the building of infrastructure.
Outsiders can be a negative in￿ uence when they directly intervene in con￿ ict
and even instigate con￿ ict, wittingly or unwittingly. When outside economic in-
terests feel threatened by a government and ￿nance military opposition, even as
a bargaining device, the level of trust and ability to commit to future agreements
(that is, the level of ￿) between the government and its domestic adversaries
cannot but deteriorate. Large states with long-term geopolitical interests might
want to undermine stability in another large state￿ s backyard of a satellite state
and undermine domestic stability there or simply makes sure to fuel continued
con￿ ict. Even some actions of the "international community" that are professed
to be in the interest of peace and stability could unwittingly, and arguably, un-
dermine stability and peace.12
Given that the world has become increasingly globalized economically since
World War II, it would be di¢ cult to conceive of internal con￿ icts in isolation
from the rest of the world and the role that outside actors play in either al-
leviating or exacerbating these con￿ icts. Yet, there appears to be a dearth of
research on the e⁄ect of outsiders on the instigation and resolution of con￿ icts
(for example, there is very little recognition of outside factors in civil war, other
than some mention of the Cold War, in Collier et. al., 2003).
3.2 History
Thinking of con￿ ict management institutions as capital inevitably brings forth
the importance of what has occurred in the past between the adversaries in-
contribute to the incidence of civil wars (see Herbst, 2000 and Spears, 2002).
11Doyle and Sambanis (2000) ￿nd a positive role for UN peacekeeping operations, whereas
Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2005) ￿nd evidence of a positive e⁄ect of UN peacekeeping
operations but no discernible e⁄ect on non-UN operations.
12Prunier (2009), for example, makes a strong case that a series of actions by Western states
and NGOs both prolonged the Rwandan genocide and subsequently unwittingly facilitated the
intensi￿cation of the wars in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
13volved in con￿ ict and in the history of the country in general. Very intense and
long-lasting con￿ icts may be intractable13. Weak governance in the ￿rst place
is more likely to lead to con￿ ict. And once con￿ ict begins, whatever little capital
of con￿ ict management existed beforehand can quickly depreciate. Bureaucra-
cies, courts, security agencies can deteriorate or stop functioning altogether.
Even channels of communication and diplomacy may shut down. Achieving a
long-lasting agreement, then, could become ever harder as con￿ ict progresses.
Political and governance traditions from the past could help to at least start
negotiation. These can vary widely and can include traditional tribal practices
of elder gatherings to governance practices inherited from the more recent past
of contact with the rest of the world.
3.3 Investments by the adversaries
In the end, given whatever capital has been left over from the past and with
the help (or hindrance) of outsiders, the adversaries themselves will need to
negotiate, structure an agreement, and make sure that it is long-lasting. That
is, the parties themselves can be thought of as making investments in con￿ ict
management and governance. The actual choices of investment by the parties
can be ordinary non-cooperative choices or closer to the socially optimal ones
(which are higher than the noncooperative choices.) We next turn to a formal
analysis of this problem.
4 Endogenous determination of state capacity
As we mentioned earlier the parameter ￿ can be considered a function of the
total "capital", K , in con￿ ict management and governance, where ￿ (K) denotes
the relevant function. K can be broken down into two parts: K￿; the capital
that has been inherited from the past and includes the e⁄ects of third parties;
and the investments undertaken by the two parties, IA and IB. Thus, ￿ =
￿ (IA + IB + K￿): In addition to ￿ (￿) being increasing in its argument, we
assume that it is strictly concave and di⁄erentiable. Furthermore, let q denote
the price of these investments to each party.
13Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) ￿nd that more intense con￿icts result in less sustainable
peace. Cunningham (2006) ￿nds that longer wars produce more spoilers and veto players
which further perpetuate con￿ict.
14To keep our analysis simple and the main idea clear, we here suppose that
each of the two adversaries can undertake a one-time investment in state ca-
pacity capital. After they make their investments simultaneously and publicly,
they engage in the interaction studied in Section 2. That is, after making their
investments, they then decide how much to arm and whether or not to engage
in con￿ ict. As before, con￿ ict occurs if one or both choose it.
Let ￿￿ denote the minimum level of state capacity, given the other parame-
ters￿values, for which the Peace equilibrium exists. If ￿ (K￿) ￿ ￿￿, then Peace
can be sustained no matter the investments IA and IB. The interesting case,
and the case which we assume from now on, is when ￿ (K￿) < ￿￿.
We again focus on symmetric strategies both before and after investments
are made. If investments raise ￿ (IA + IB + K￿) above ￿￿, then we assume the
(symmetric) Peace equilibrium is played thereafter. If ￿ (IA + IB + K￿) < ￿￿,
then the (symmetric) War equilibrium prevails. Thus, we need to ￿nd under
what conditions the groups will choose investments that raise the total capital
to a level above the threshold ￿￿.14
Given symmetric coordinated actions after investments, the expected payo⁄












Y ￿ qIi if ￿ (IA + IB + K￿) < ￿￿:
(9)
Because peace requires a threshold level of state capacity, any investments into
state capacity that do not bring ￿ to or above ￿￿ will be wasted. It follows that
if investments in state capacity cannot bring security to or above the threshold
level ￿￿; no investment can be expected at all.
As before, a War equilibrium in which each selects (Ii = 0;g￿
W;War) always
exists. The strategy of interest to us has each group select (I￿;g￿
P;Peace) with
￿ (2I￿ + K￿) ￿ ￿￿. Given that the last two in this triplet have been studied
above, we need only determine when the investment I￿ is optimal given the
opponent chooses this strategy.
There are two things to consider here: what is the I￿ that maximizes
14We ignore here dynamic considerations that migh induce each side to invest looking into
building capital for the future even though they would go to War now. A model that has
genuine dynamics would be required to allow for that possibility.
15the Peace payo⁄, and is each contributing I￿ enough to bring state capacity
above ￿￿. We examine each of these in turn. The ￿rst order condition of
the Vi (IA;IB) Peace payo⁄ with IA = IB = I￿ identi￿es the best investments
assuming Peace:
￿0 (2I￿ + K￿) =

















then the Peace with investment equilibrium exists.
This last condition reveals that high destruction from con￿ ict (low ￿) makes
Peace more likely. It is also worth noting the role of the state capacity function.
For investments in Peace to occur, the returns to investment must be su¢ ciently
large. For one, the slope of the state capacity function must be su¢ ciently high.









4q (1 ￿ ￿)
Y
:
If current investment brings the adversaries right to the threshold capital level,
then the adversaries must be willing to maintain (or exceed) those investments.
Intuitively, this requires the price of investment q to be su¢ ciently low, and as
in Section 2 the discount factor must be su¢ ciently low. However, observe that
Y must also be su¢ ciently large. If the rents are too low, then the prize is not
worth the investment in state capacity.
We ￿nd this last result to be signi￿cant. In most models of con￿ ict, a higher
prize implies higher arming and worse con￿ ict. Here we also ￿nd arming to
increase in the size of the prize holding all else constant, yet there are mitigating
factors that may swamp out that e⁄ect. As income rises, so do the returns to
Peace and the returns to investments in the institutions that foster Peace. If
the technology exists to create governance institutions, then the rising returns
to Peace through investing in institutions may lead adversaries to the bargaining
table as Y increases.
However, there are two constraints that might well prevent the implemen-
tation of Peace under (9). First, one problem might be the capacity to build
I￿
A+I￿
B; when, as we discussed earlier, modern governing institutions take many
years and decades to build. Second, even if the institutions could be built at
16once, it is likely the ￿scal capacity of the adversaries would be severely limited
and they could contribute only a fraction of the equilibrium level of investment.
When obstacles to reaching equilibrium powersharing implied by (9) exist, then
there is space for a good-willed outsider to intervene.
Plugging in I￿ = 1












Although a change in K￿ does not change K￿, it does a⁄ect the payo⁄s of
the two groups. Due to the substitutability between K￿ and the adversaries￿
investments IA and IB; an increase in K￿ increases the adversaries￿payo⁄s in
the case of Peace because the adversaries need only invest smaller amounts to
achieve Peace. This result is illustrated in Figure 2. The upward sloping line
is the Peace payo⁄ (12), and the War payo⁄ is the horizontal line. For any
K￿ ￿ e K￿, the adversaries can sustain Peace, but Peace is not sustainable with
K￿ < e K￿.
Outside forces can help or hinder Peace. By lowering K￿ via actions de-
structive to state capacity, outside forces can transform a peaceful setting into
a con￿ ictual one. By raising K￿ via actions that build local institutions di-
rectly or by providing resources conducive to the development of governance
institutions, outside forces can help foster peace.
Finally, we observe that the positive externality associated with investment
in state capacity will likely yield an underprovision of governance institutions,
just as positive externalities lead to underinvestment in public goods in general.
When investments for Peace work, the equilibrium will be ine¢ cient. Welfare
(in the form of the sum of payo⁄s) is maximized at (IA;IB) =
￿






VA (IA;IB) + VB (IA;IB):








2b I + K￿
￿￿
Y ￿ qb I;







2q (1 ￿ ￿)
Y
: (13)
17By comparing (10) and (13) it is clear that b I > I￿ and b K > K￿ = 2I￿+K￿,
i.e., the level of security under welfare maximization would be higher than under
equilibrium, the amount of arming necessary to maintain Peace would be lower
and, of course, payo⁄s and welfare would be higher.
Obviously, since the optimal level of investment is not an equilibrium, it
would be harder to implement in a con￿ ictual environment. Moreover, since
there may be any number of challenges to implementing the equilibrium levels
of investment (capacity to build, ￿scal constraints), the implied optimal levels
which are even higher would be very di¢ cult to achieve.
This suggests that wealthier countries should enjoy higher levels of secu-
rity, at least in the long run when liquidity and capacity constraints are relaxed.
External help that can overcome these liquidity and capacity constraints may
promote attainment of equilibrium levels of security. It is important to highlight
the distinction here between relaxation of liquidity and capacity constraints and
substituted capacity from international actors. Relaxation of liquidity and ca-
pacity constraints e⁄ectively creates the commitment space for adversaries to
make their own investments in state capacity. Meanwhile, substituted capac-
ity, as described above, can supplant and even reduce the incentives for actors
to invest in their own state capacity, reducing the attainability of sustainable
peaceful equilibria.
Both the equilibrium and optimal levels of investment, however, share some
similar comparative static results. Using (10) and (13), it can be demonstrated
that the respective investment levels are (i) increasing in the contestable income
Y ; (ii) increasing in the discount factor ￿; and (iii) decreasing in the price of
investments q: This suggests that wealthier countries should enjoy higher levels
of security, at least in the long run when liquidity and capacity constraints are
relaxed. External help that can overcome these liquidity and capacity constraints
may promote attainment of equilibrium levels of security.
The e⁄ect of the discount factor is the same implied by a folk-theorem ar-
gument and contrary to the e⁄ect it has on arming e⁄ect that we found earlier.
Therefore, the shadow of the future can have two countervailing e⁄ects. Which
e⁄ect dominates on arming can be expected to depend on the particular func-
tional form of ￿(￿) and the initial parameters.
185 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we develop a simple model of con￿ ict, allowing actors to invest in
state capacity for commitment. We ￿rst employ a model in which state capacity
is given exogenously to demonstrate what conditions are necessary for war to
be an equilibrium solution. The model suggests that states with low capacity
where con￿ ict is not very destructive should experience more con￿ ict.
Our model also introduces a channel through which income reduces the like-
lihood of con￿ ict, namely state capacity. This reconciles theoretical models of
con￿ ict which have suggested that when income is high, there should be more
con￿ ict as there is more to ￿ght over to the empirical literature in which con-
￿ icts are observed with greater frequency in low income countries. When we
allow for endogenous investments in state capacity, the model demonstrates how
investments for peace by both actors can make peace a stable outcome.
Here we have applied the model to post-con￿ ict states. However, these re-
lationships among elites or other spoilers to peace may exist in any con￿ ictual
environment, developing and developed countries alike. This model could be
extended to explore exactly how actors have invested in state capacity and
avoided con￿ ict, especially for conditions which seem otherwise ripe for civil
con￿ ict. The model could be tested empirically using measures of post-con￿ ict
institution building and post-con￿ ict demobilization and disarmament ￿ceteris
paribus we would expect peace to last in environments where institutions im-
prove and arming decreases.
19APPENDIX
A Type Three Deviations with Exogenous ￿
Suppose (￿ = 0;￿ = 1), which implies g￿
P = 1
4Y . Our deviation condition of


















































If there exists an x which violates this condition, then clearly there is an optimal





















Thus, with (￿ = 0;￿ = 1) and ￿ su¢ ciently large, there is an x that violates the
condition.
Now suppose (￿ = 1;￿ = 0), which implies g￿
P = 0. The RHS of the devia-














Thus, with (￿ = 1;￿ = 0) and ￿ su¢ ciently small, the condition is satis￿ed.
Applying continuity and the intermediate value theorem, there must be a
(￿￿￿;￿
￿￿;￿
￿￿), such that the deviation condition is satis￿ed and the Peace equi-
librium exists when ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿, ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿, and ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿.
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Figure 2:  Value Functions for War and Peace 
with Endogenous σ 
 